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At its heart, computational creativity is the study of build-
ing software that exhibits behavior that would be deemed cre-
ative in humans. Such creative software can be used for
autonomous creative tasks, such as inventing mathematical the-
ories, writing poems, painting pictures, and composing music.
However, computational creativity studies also enable us to
understand human creativity and to produce programs for cre-
ative people to use, where the software acts as a creative collab-
orator rather than a mere tool. Historically, it’s been difﬁcult for
society to come to terms with machines that purport to be intel-
ligent and even more difﬁcult to admit that they might be cre-
ative. For instance, in 1934, some professors at the University of
Manchester in the United Kingdom built meccano models that
were able to solve some mathematical equations. Groundbreak-
ing for its time, this project was written up in a piece in  Mecca-
no Magazine. The article was titled “Are Thinking Machines Pos-
sible” and was very upbeat, but surprisingly ends by stating that
“Truly creative thinking of course will always remain beyond
the power of any machine.”
Surely, though, this attitude has changed in light of the amaz-
ing advances in hardware and software technology that fol-
lowed those meccano models? Sadly, no. Not much. Even with-
in computer science, people are still skeptical about the creative
potential of software. For instance, in Non-Photorealistic Render-
ing, a graphics textbook published in 2000, authors Thomas
Stothotte and Stefan Schlechtweg boldly state that “simulating
artistic techniques means also simulating human thinking and
reasoning, especially creative thinking. This is impossible to do
using algorithms or information processing systems.” We could-
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n’t disagree more. As is hopefully evident from the
articles in this volume, creativity is not some mys-
tical gift that is beyond scientiﬁc study but rather
something that can be investigated, simulated, and
harnessed for the good of society. And while soci-
ety might still be catching up, computational cre-
ativity as a discipline has come of age. This matu-
rity is evident in the amount of activity related to
computational creativity in recent years; in the
sophistication of the creative software we are
building; in the cultural value of the artifacts being
produced by our software; and most importantly,
in the consensus we are ﬁnding on general issues
of computer creativity.
In the early days of AI research, many of the
projects had grand goals: to build software able to
compose sonatas, invent mathematical theories,
and so on. In those days, the artifact-generation
paradigm reigned supreme: the emphasis was on
software that simulated entire reasoning and
invention processes in order to build artifacts of
real value. However, as further studies highlighted
how difﬁcult it is to implement artiﬁcially intelli-
gent programs, AI researchers adopted the prob-
lem-solving paradigm. Here, an intelligent task is
immediately broken down into manageable sub-
parts and characterized as either a machine-learn-
ing problem, a planning problem, a theorem-prov-
ing problem, and so on. This kind of shoehorning
enabled AI research to advance and—important-
ly—to demonstrate advances in concrete terms.
Research in these subareas ﬂourished, but it frag-
mented AI research: how many people regularly go
to both machine-learning and theorem-proving
conferences, for instance?
While problem solving certainly requires cre-
ativity, the majority of computational creativity
researchers are more interested in the artifact-gen-
eration paradigm and are actively engaged in put-
ting the pieces back together again. In this way, by
combining AI systems, we are able to “climb the
metamountain.” By this, we mean that individual
techniques from AI and other areas of computing
such as graphics are sufﬁciently powerful enough
for us to enable software to take on tasks at increas-
ing metalevels. For instance, automated painting
has largely been associated with graphics research,
where researchers have produced great tools that
simulate some physical aspects of the painting
process but not the cognitive aspects. Computa-
tional creativity researchers take their techniques,
and ones from machine vision and other areas of
AI, and simulate the way in which artists use these
tools, for instance, by implementing scene con-
struction methods. After this, we can look at the
motivation for scene construction to express cer-
tain concepts and ideas, and so on. In this fashion,
more of the cognitive aspects of creative processes
are simulated, and artifacts of higher cultural val-
ue are produced by increasingly autonomous cre-
ative systems.
In the article by Amilcar Cardoso, Geraint Wig-
gins, and Tony Veale (“Converging on the Diver-
gent: The History [and Future] of the Internation-
al Joint Workshops in Computational Cre -
ativity”), more of the issues about which the com-
munity is coming to consensus are explored. This
is done within the context of a survey of 10 years
of computational creativity workshops. The
authors start by separating the word creativity
from the concept of “creativity,” and put both of
these into historical context. In addition to his-
torical case studies, they survey, compare, and
contrast the philosophical and practical contribu-
tions made by key players in the field over the
years and describe some logistics, such as the rise
of the “show and tell” sessions at the annual
meetings. They end by highlighting the prospects
for research in this area and arguing that the field
of computational creativity is very close to hav-
ing firm enough foundations for rigorous scien-
tific investigations in the future. This will be test-
ed in coming years, as the series of computational
creativity workshops evolves into the first com-
putational creativity conference, to be held in Lis-
bon in January 2010.1
Margaret Boden has been a key player in the
ﬁeld of computational creativity for a long time,
having authored a number of inﬂuential books
and papers. Her scholarly article here (“Computer
Models of Creativity”) examines some of the
thorny philosophical issues surrounding human
and computer creativity. Unlike some authors
working on creativity issues, she starts from the
premise that creativity isn’t a magical process that
should be held in awe. From this starting point,
Boden goes on to describe various ways in which
computers can—and do—exhibit the same kinds
of behaviors that creative humans do. With special
emphasis on humor and visual arts as application
domains, and looking at evolutionary processes as
particularly valuable for computational creativity,
Boden characterizes creative behaviors in terms of
computer exploration, whether combinatorial and
transformational. The article ends by posing a
question about whether computers can be truly
creative and by pointing out that through AI
research, we now have an understanding of what
sort of phenomenon creativity is.
The article by Gerhard Widmer, Sebastian Floss-
mann, and Maarten Grachten (“YQX Plays
Chopin”) describes a computer program that
learns to expressively perform classical piano
music. The approach is data intensive and based
on statistical learning. Performing music expres-
sively certainly requires high levels of creativity,
but the authors take a very pragmatic view to the
question of whether their program can be said to
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be creative or not and claim that “creativity is in
the eye of the beholder.” In fact, the main goal of
the authors is to investigate and better under-
stand music performance as a creative human
behavior by means of AI methods. AI has played
a crucial role in the history of computer music
almost since its beginning in the 1950s. However,
until quite recently, most effort had been on com-
positional and improvisational systems and little
efforts had been devoted to expressive perform-
ance.
The article by Pablo Gervás (“Computational
Approaches to Storytelling and Creativity”) ﬁrst
addresses the issue of creativity from a general per-
spective, not only emphasizing the main features
of interest in any creative process, such as novelty,
unexpectedness, and usefulness (or goal satisfac-
tion) of the output of the creative process, but also
considering who is the intended audience and
whether the output is expected to be novel with
respect to previous outputs by the same system (or
only with respect to an inspiring set). He then
focuses on computational creativity and discusses
a number of issues that have been identiﬁed as rel-
evant to the computational modeling of creativity
(whether it can be reduced to search or whether it
should involve transforming a space, and to what
extent it is inﬂuenced by the social context in
which it takes place). Next he discusses the main
features of interest in storytelling in terms of basic
concepts from literary theory and then reviews
representative storytelling systems and discusses
them both in terms of how they deal with the fea-
tures of interest in storytelling discussed in the ﬁrst
part of the paper and in terms of whether they
introduce new additional features that need to be
contemplated.
Chess has been a traditional challenge for AI. It
took longer than expected, but now there is little
controversy about the fact that the best programs
outperform the best human players. At some
recent matches between a series of outstanding
champions and Bushinsky’s and Ban’s Deep Junior
(of course won by the latter, still computer chess
world champion), the most appreciated feature of
the program that emerged in the after-match com-
ments of the losers and of the independent spe-
cialized commentators was its creativity. The paper
by Shay Bushinsky (“Deus Ex Machina—A Higher
Creative Species in the Game of Chess”) talks
speciﬁcally about that, with a number of very
interesting examples and discussions about the
prospects for the ﬁeld. Even if it achieved remark-
able results, Bushinsky points out that there are
still several challenging developments ahead.
The article by Graeme Ritchie (“Can Computers
Create Humor?”) deals with computational
humor, that is, the ﬁeld devoted to the automated
generation of humor and to the appreciation of
humor. To some, the ﬁeld may sound too ambi-
tious: many people view humor as one of the most
intriguing and distinguished forms of intelligence.
In fact, if an artiﬁcial system were to produce jokes
and forms of humor of all sorts, it would be based
on the realization of most intelligent capabilities.
The computational humor scope is currently much
narrower, but some interesting forms of humor,
like puns, funny ambiguous references, or for that
matter ironical expressions, can be produced auto-
matically. Ritchie provides an overview of some
realizations, which in fact display a certain level of
creativity, and discusses various aspects involved.
Our ﬁnal article is a surprise, a kind of special
guest for this issue of AI Magazine. It is a pleasure
to include in this collection of written contribu-
tions something different, food for the brain in an
artistic literary form, produced by EWI: an essay in
the style of Douglas Hofstadter. Well, we cannot
say more, you have to read it.
Computational creativity is a very lively subject
area, with many issues still open to debate. For
instance, many people still turn to the Turing test
(and variants of it) to approximate the value of the
artifacts produced by their software. That is, if a
certain number of people cannot determine which
artifacts were produced by computer and which
were produced by a human, then the software is
doing well. Other people believe that the Turing
test is inappropriate for creative software. One has
to ask the question, “Under full disclosure, would
people value the artifacts produced by a computer
as highly as they would the human produced
ones?” In some domains, the answer could be yes:
for instance, a joke is still funny whether or not it
is produced by a computer. In other domains, such
as the visual arts, however, the answer is very like-
ly to be no. This highlights the fact that the pro-
duction process is taken into account when assess-
ing artworks. Hence, one could argue that such
Turing-style tests are essentially setting the com-
puters up for a fall. “Aha,” says the Turing tester,
“these were produced by a human artist…. And
these were produced by a convicted murderer!” We
hope this makes the point without being too crass.
Building creative software provides both a techni-
cal challenge and a societal one. To proceed fur-
ther, we need to embrace the fact that computers
aren’t human. We should be loud and proud about
the artifacts being produced by our software, not
ashamed that they weren’t produced by humans.
We should celebrate the sophistication of the AI
techniques we’ve employed to endow the software
with creative behavior. And we should help the
general public to appreciate the value of these
computer creations by describing the methods
employed by the software to create them.
New technologies, and in particular artiﬁcial
intelligence, are drastically changing the nature of
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creative processes. Computers are playing very sig-
niﬁcant roles in creative activities such as music,
architecture, ﬁne arts, and science. Indeed, the
computer is already a canvas, a brush, a musical
instrument, and so on. However, we believe that
we must aim at more ambitious relations between
computers and creativity. Rather than just seeing
the computer as a tool to help human creators, we
could see it as a creative entity in its own right.
Creativity seems mysterious because when we have
creative ideas it is very difﬁcult to explain how we
got them and we often talk about vague notions
like “inspiration” and “intuition” when we try to
explain creativity. The fact that we are not con-
scious of how a creative idea manifests itself does
not necessarily imply that a scientiﬁc explanation
cannot exist. As a matter of fact, we are not aware
of how we perform other activities such as lan-
guage understanding, pattern recognition, and so
on, but we have better and better AI techniques
able to replicate such activities. We agree with
those that believe that creativity is an advanced
form of our reasoning that involves memory, anal-
ogy, learning, and reasoning under constraints,
among others, and is therefore possible to replicate
by means of computers. This special issue address-
es the question of the possibility of achieving arti-
ﬁcial creativity through some examples of com-
puter programs capable of replicating some aspects
of creative behavior in several areas. We did not
intend to cover the full range of AI approaches to
computational creativity and we could not include
all areas of application. The issue contains details
of projects in the visual arts, music, storytelling,
chess, and humor, in addition to providing an
overview of the recent history of computational
creativity and plenty of fuel for thought from a
philosophical perspective.
To end, a ﬁnal thought that helps to distinguish
computational creativity research from other areas
of artiﬁcial intelligence, and that might provide
some ammunition against people who worry
about our technological future. Good art makes
you think. Whether it is a quick belly laugh at the
punch line from a comedian or an in-depth reﬂec-
tion on the futility of war when viewing a painting
like Picasso’s Guernica, people who create artifacts
do so in the hope that the artifact will make peo-
ple engage their brains at an emotional or a cogni-
tive level. This could be taken as our stated aim in
computational creativity research: to build
machines that can challenge us through artistic
and scientiﬁc means. Of course, this will require
the simulation of intelligence, but simulating
thought processes is only one of our aims: we want
to encourage thought processes in others, which is
where we differ from other areas of AI. And when
someone worries about the human race losing the
ability to think for themselves because of smart
machines, please mention the automated painters,
writers, composers, and scientists we’re building
speciﬁcally to encourage them to think more.
Note
1. See creative-systems.dei.uc.pt/icccx.
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